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"Impunity for international crimes and for systematic and widespread violations
of fundamental human rights is a betrayal of our human solidarity with the
victims of conflicts to whom we owe a duty of justice, remembrance, and
compensation."'
Numerous political changes have occurred in the past twenty years.
Repressive dictatorships have been replaced by democratic governments in many
countries. A significant component of these transitions has been acknowledging
and reconciling the human rights abuses committed by the previous regime. In an
attempt to achieve closure to the past conflict, several of these countries have
passed amnesty laws covering members of the former regimes. In some cases, the
amnesty provision was even endorsed by the United Nations as an effort to restore
peace and ensure a successful democratic transition. 2 However, the attainment of
peace does not in each single instance correspond to the pursuit of justice. Ideals of
peace should remain subject to the international norms relating to threshold human
rights standards. Thus, scholars have suggested that granting amnesty to those who
commit serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law is
incompatible with the purposes and objectives of world order.3 Prosecuting the
alleged offenders has become an affirmative duty and a necessary step toward the
achievement of justice. Accordingly, states have an international obligation to
provide for individual accountability mechanisms in order to hold human rights
violators responsible for the atrocities committed.4
This Article will focus on the issue of accountability under the existing
international law and will address the following question: Is there a duty to
prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses? Furthermore, if there is such a duty,
Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This Article represents the views of the author
only and not those of her law firm. J.D./Maitrise en Droit, Cornell Law School and Universit6 Paris I-
Panth6on-Sorbonne, 2002; D.E.A. (Master's Degree), Private International Law, Universit6 Paris I-
Panthdon-Sorbonne, 2003; B.A., French Literature and Political Science, Rutgers University, 1998.
1. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,
59 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 27 (1996).
2. See Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 41 (1996) (noting that the United
Nations helped negotiate amnesties in Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, and South Africa). See also Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in
International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449, 484-85, n. 187 (1990).
3. See generally ASPEN INST. STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON - RAPERS AND REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE (1989).
4. See id
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what are its precise contours, its reach and its limits? Can amnesty laws and truth
commissions ever be legal despite the evolving body of human rights law that
seems to dictate the absolute assurance of those rights? Part I of this Article will
examine the existing accountability mechanisms, while evaluating their respective
strengths and weaknesses. Part II will focus on the existing state practice regarding
amnesty laws in the context of two different political and geographic paradigms,
Latin America and South Africa. Part III will study the international documents
and customs imposing legal obligations on states to provide for effective
accountability measures. Finally, Part IV will seek to define particular
circumstances under which amnesty provisions and truth commissions do or do not
fulfill the global mandates of justice as it relates to individual responsibility. Do
amnesty laws provide for defacto impunity, or do they represent effective methods
of achieving a legitimate form of accountability while preserving internal peace
and stability.?
II. EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
The theoretical conclusion that a particular individual should be held
accountable for his or her violations of threshold human rights norms is merely the
first step in the entire process of bringing about justice. Once we reach the
conclusion that justice can only be served by imposing individual responsibility on
the alleged offender, the question of "how?" immediately springs to mind. Under
the current international regime, three different accountability mechanisms exist.
5
First, national courts provide a forum for the prosecution of such offenders in cases
where the offender or the crimes committed are somehow linked to the particular
country.6 National courts also provide a forum when a country has implemented
domestic legislation incorporating the principle of universal jurisdiction. 7 Second,
international tribunals represent another type of forum for the prosecution of
human rights violations. These include the ad hoc bodies, such as the International
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, as well as the International Criminal Court and similar regional fora,
namely the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court.
8
Third, non-legal sanctions, most often in the form of truth commissions and
amnesties, seek to redress past crimes by shifting the focus of accountability from
its penal function toward reconciliation and an all-encompassing "coming to terms
with the past" solution. The three mechanisms are not mutually exclusive; in fact, a
successful interplay of the different fora could represent the most desirable
solution in some cases. The following sections evaluate the strengths and the
5. See generally Neil J. Kritz, Coming To Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms For Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1996);
Bassiouni, supra note 1; Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The
Universal Declaration and the Searchfor Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591 (1998).
6. See generally Kritz, supra note 5, at 136-39 (using the example of Bosnia to illustrate the
difficulties that national prosecutions can encounter in ethnically or politically divided societies).
7. Id.
8. See generally id. (discussing the ad hoc tribunals in Bosnia and Rwanda); see generally 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni 2d ed. 1998).
VOL. 34:3
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weaknesses of each particular accountability measure as the necessary procedural
framework in the pursuit of justice.
A. National Courts
Prosecution of human rights offenders before domestic tribunals can serve
important political, legal, and societal functions. First, such trials can foster the
political legitimacy of the new regime from both international and national
perspectives. 9 That is, the successor government projects to the outside world its
willingness to abide by the existing human rights standards and reassures the
global community that there will be no further violations. ° Thus, the new leaders
establish themselves as the "good guys" by choosing to redress past offenses.
Furthermore, the successor regime proves to its own citizens the restored respect of
human rights that had been lacking in that particular country. The new government
thereby detaches itself from the previous "offending" regime and enhances its own
credibility and trustworthiness in the eyes of its subjects. I' Second, national
prosecutions of human rights violators serve to rebuild the local judiciary and
criminal justice system, thereby accomplishing a significant legal function. These
prosecutions establish local courts as credible and fair fora and enhance the respect
for the entire transition process of the particular country. 12 Third, domestic
prosecutions serve a societal goal by bridging the gap between the violent,
precarious past and the hopeful future. National courts can render verdicts of more
"symbolic force. ' 3 These verdicts signify not only the culpability of an individual
offender, but furthermore inculpate the entire previous regime: its practices,
standards, and procedures. The new government accomplishes an enormous task
through a national prosecution: it acknowledges the wrong from the past; it
establishes respect for the present; and it promises hope for the future.
From a pragmatic point of view, national prosecution may represent the best
solution in a particular case. However, where the transition process had been
tenuous and where the current situation is still unstable, an international
proceeding insensitive to the "nuances of local culture" could result in more direct
harm to the country.14 International tribunals may not be willing or capable to
prosecute all of the accountable individuals, thereby failing to produce "complete"
justice from both the moral and the legal point of view.' 5 Lastly, an international
judicial organ may not even exist which is available to prosecute particular
offenders. ' 6 Thus, domestic tribunals represent not only a valuable resource in the
9. See Kritz, supra note 5, at 132.
10. See id. at 132-133.
11. See id.
12. Seeid. at 133.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. (noting that the international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have
limited their prosecutions to a relatively small number of people for both practicality and policy
reasons). The Special Court for Sierra Leone, similarly, will only be able to prosecute about ten
individuals due to its comparatively small budget of$ 10 million.
16. See id.
2006
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pursuit of international justice, but often the only legal mechanism providing for
accountability.
However, prosecutions before domestic tribunals can fall short of fulfilling
the goals of justice. Irregularity of procedure, political pressures, and societal strife
too often color the contours of domestic criminal proceedings, consequently
undermining the attempt to define individual accountability.' 7 First, domestic trials
may fail to meet international fairness standards, including the right to counsel, the
introduction and examination of evidence and witnesses, and the transparency of
procedures. Witnesses may be unavailable due to the precarious political situation
in the region; judges may be biased because of political influences or corruption,
and lawyers may be uninterested and incompetent. Second, national courts may be
severely limited in their jurisdictional reach. In most cases, domestic legislation
only provides for accountability for persons somehow linked to the country.
Statutes implementing universal jurisdiction are rare, as most states are hesitant to
implement them due to concerns of comity and state sovereignty. 8 Third, the
political situation of the country may dictate certain results. The current regime,
fearful of being incriminated itself, could prevent access to documents and relevant
evidence. Conversely, the regime in power could seek to benefit from the trial by
demonstrating to the people its own willingness to be different from the past rulers.
Such a government could impose the desired outcome of guilt and severe
punishment on the alleged offender while ignoring standards of fair trials and due
process rights. 19 Finally, a domestic prosecution could deepen an already existing
ethnic or societal gap by allocating the blame for previous offenses on a particular
group. The entire process could thus be viewed "as a collective mea culpa of sorts,
a potent acknowledgment and repudiation of such sordid crime committed by
one's compatriots."2 ° The prosecutions in such a scenario become a means of
prolonging the conflict rather than a mechanism of justice and reconciliation.
Therefore, criminal proceedings in domestic fora can, in certain situations, worsen
the political situation of the country and further obscure the pursuit of justice.
B. International Tribunals
The advantage of international prosecutions for violations of human rights lies
in the obvious fact that such processes are international. A global forum can
therefore "convey a clear message that the international community will not
tolerate such atrocities, hopefully deterring future carnage of that sort both in the
country in question and worldwide." 21 In addition to the deterrence value of
international prosecutions, such legal measures can also enhance the development
17. See generally id. at 136-139 (using the example of Bosnia to illustrate the difficulties that
national prosecutions can encounter in ethnically or politically divided societies).
18. For a fuller discussion of the principle of universal jurisdiction, see BARRY E. CARTER &
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 766-78 (1991). See also 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
298 (M. Cherif Bassiouni 2d ed. 1986).
19. For a discussion of dangers of unfairness related to domestic trials, see Kritz, supra note 5, at
134-35.
20. Id. at 136.
21. Id. at 129.
VOL. 34:3
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of international criminal norms. Key proceedings, such as Nuremberg or even the
trials before the ad hoc bodies for Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone,
establish specific precedents and strengthen the general proposition that human
rights violations are of global concern. 22 International proceedings thus serve to
circumvent concepts of national sovereignty and to establish once and for all that
no human rights offender can be immunized from the reach of international law.
Furthermore, international proceedings are advantageous with respect to
domestic trials for several practical reasons. First, an international tribunal is more
likely to be staffed with experts, qualified attorneys, skillful prosecutors, and
neutral judges. 23 Second, such a tribunal will most likely apply international law to
a particular offense. This in turn eliminates the risk of murky domestic legislation
as the substantive body of law and further advances the international standards
sought to be respected. Third, an international body can often do more than a local
tribunal.24 That is, problems of personal jurisdiction and access to evidence are
often more easily solved by an international judicial organ whose statute has been
implemented to deal specifically with these kinds of situations and whose global
reputation could procure cooperation by third parties and by the allegedly "neutral"
governments. 25 International fora for accountability can, in certain contexts,
represent a far more attractive option for the redress of human rights violations.
However, international judicial bodies are not infallible. First, as mentioned
above, international prosecutions are often insensitive of the particular country's
political situation. A proceeding focused solely on the pursuit of absolute truth
with a clearly contemplated criminal punishment may do more than is needed in a
specific context. That is, reconciliation may become too hard to implement in a
society already torn by civil or ethnic strife after a full-blown criminal
investigation uncovers the often too painful details about the atrocities committed.
A particular society may be on the verge of forgiveness with a non-legal
accountability method already in place. An international proceeding in such an
instance looks more like an intrusion upon a struggling society than a facet of
global justice.26
Second, international tribunals may be even more limited in their reach than
the domestic fora. In most cases, these judicial bodies are products of international
cooperation and compromise. They represent the least common denominator of
human rights norms, encompassing only those that the majority of the world thinks
should be respected in the absolute sense.27 Furthermore, international tribunals are
22. See id. at 129-32 (noting the advantages of international tribunals over domestic prosecutions).
23. See id. at 129.
24. See id. at 129-30.
25. See Kritz, supra note 5, at 129-30. In many cases, potential defendants have left the territory
where the atrocities were committed or are generally inaccessible; thus, "an international tribunal stands
a greater chance than local courts of obtaining their physical custody and extradition." Id. at 129.
26. See id. at 145-46 (noting problems in the relationship between the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the country of Rwanda itself). "[I]t was almost as though a nation still reeling
and traumatized by a horrific genocide was completely irrelevant to tribunal officials .... Id. at 146.
27. See Joyner, supra note 5, at 609 (noting that international tribunals are often influenced by the
Great Powers on the Security Council and that such political considerations can undermine their
2006
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often ad hoc, with statutes written in accordance with a particular situation, a
specific war, or a peculiar context. Their reach may be undermined in irregular,
unusual situations that do not fit the drafters' contemplated model of
accountability. 28 Third, international prosecutions may have less impact on the
implicated country. 29 The proceedings are often conducted in a language foreign to
the relevant nation, the sessions usually take place in the western hemisphere, the
decisions are seen as a product of occidental bias and victor's justice, and the
people most directly affected may not even be aware of the particular prosecution.
Therefore, international fora for individual accountability, even though functioning
under the pretext of universal justice, may fail to redress a particular grievance and
may not reach their specifically mandated goals.
C. Non-Legal Sanctions: Amnesties and Truth Commissions
In an attempt to deal with the aftermath of massive human rights violations,
many countries have established non-legal accountability mechanisms, such as
amnesties and truth commissions. 30 While falling short of criminal sanctions, these
methods can often represent meaningful measures that not only redress previous
grievances, but also acknowledge human rights violations.
Most cases of human rights abuses involve mass participation in the
committed brutalities. Criminal prosecutions are per se selective: "prosecution of
every single participant in the planning, ordering, or implementation of the
atrocities in question... would be politically destabilizing, socially divisive, and
logistically and economically untenable." 31 The accountability mechanism of non-
legal sanctions can be the most broadly applied, the farthest-reaching, and the most
all-encompassing. Furthermore, amnesties and truth commissions can represent a
legitimate and official acknowledgment of the past abuses by an official
government body. They enhance both the domestic and the international credibility
of the current regime without unleashing divisive societal forces that too often
accompany criminal prosecutions. 32 These accountability mechanisms also provide
the framework for official investigations, permit for a public catharsis of the
inflicted pain and evil, procure an impartial forum for the victims to tell their story,
and sometimes even establish a legal basis for compensation of the victims or for
punishment of the offenders. 33 Finally, amnesties and truth commissions can be
organized relatively quickly, function more promptly, and facilitate closure
regarding a troubled past.34
effective operation).
28. See id. at 609-10 (noting the weaknesses of ad hoc judicial bodies as revealed through the
examples of the Yugoslavian and the Rwandan tribunals).
29. See Kritz, supra note 5, at 132-33.
30. Some of these countries include Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Uruguay, and South Africa. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 41.
31. See Kritz, supra note 5, at 138-39.
32. See id. at 145-46; see supra text accompanying note 25.
33. Kritz, supra note 5, at 141.
34. Id. at 141-42; see Joyner, supra note 5, at 610.
VOL. 34:3
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Non-criminal accountability mechanisms can however be insufficient to
redress human rights abuses. First and foremost, the mechanisms do not impose
criminal sanctions. The notion of individual accountability inherently carries with
itself the concept of criminal liability. Thus, amnesties and truth commissions are
often seen as equating pardon with reconciliation and de facto impunity withjustice. Second, non-legal sanctions may be unfairly administered. They do not
generally afford those implicated the level of due process protections provided to
criminal defendants; they are often informal and less public; they can be subject to
political manipulation by the new regime and can produce a large, ostracized
element within the society. 36 Third, amnesties and truth commissions tend to
undermine the substantive norms of human rights law. They establish principles of
criminal impunity that can contravene duties imposed by international treaties and
custom. They modify jus cogens and erga omnes norms37 to fit the inflicted
precarious situation or the ethnically unstable region. They adopt ad hoc rules and
procedures that may be far from legitimate but are still uncontrollable and
unreachable by any other judicial organs. Thus, non-criminal fora for
accountability may convey the unwarranted message that there is no duty to
prosecute human rights offenders. "The power to forgive, forget, or overlook in the
cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture is not that of
the governments but of the victims... The recurrence of pre-prosecution amnesty is
therefore an anomalous phenomenon developed as part of a policy of impunity. 3 8
III. STATE PRACTICE: THE EXISTING PARADIGMS
Recent trends in state practice regarding individual accountability for human
rights violations committed in the course of internal conflicts point toward
permitting amnesty laws and truth commissions. In the past two decades, there
have been nineteen truth commissions in sixteen countries. 39 However, the context
of each case of amnesty is inherently different in its interplay with the international
law duty to prosecute. Namely, three major paradigms have emerged in the global
community. First, Latin American countries have experimented with amnesties and
truth commission in transitional democracies. These accountability methods
35. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that truth commissions "should not be deemed a
substitute for prosecution"); see also Kritz, supra note 5, at 141 (noting that "such an entity cannot
substitute for prosecutions").
36. See Kritz, supra note 5, at 141.
37. Jus cogens and erga omnes norms are the so-called peremptory norms that are deemed to be
so fundamental that they are both non-derogable and applicable to all states. For a fuller discussion of
these principles, see CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 17, at 98-100. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights:
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63-65(1996) (defining 'jus cogens' as the legal status that certain international crimes may reach and 'erga
omnes' as the legal implications arising out of a certain crime's characterization as jus cogens);
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 5), at
32. Scholars have argued that there are fourjus cogens crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and torture, for which prosecution should be required. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 20.
38. See Bassiouni, supra note I, at 19.
39. Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commissions and the
Duty to Punish Human Rights Offenses, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
2006
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reflected much more a "coming to terms with the past" than a pursuit of
international justice.40  Second, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is an example of a non-legal mechanism that not only acknowledges
the painful past, but that also redresses human rights violations and respects
international standards. 41 Finally, the Sierra Leonian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, while designed to parallel the largely successful South African
model, has been undermined by the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, which somewhat negated the essence and legitimacy of the Commission.
2
Thus, the Sierra Leone paradigm perfectly illustrates the existing tension between
the desire to prosecute and the need to achieve peace and reconciliation. These
differing models of non-criminal accountability measures reflect the existing state
practice and define the circumstances under which amnesties and truth
commissions become legitimate vehicles of addressing past violations of human
rights norms.
A. Latin American Amnesties and Truth Commissions
Because turbulence and civil strife have marked the political history of many
Latin American countries, it is not surprising that this region's mandate has been to
accept and redress its own past. The experiences of Argentina, Chile, and El
Salvador portray some of the different amnesty laws and truth commissions and
help clarify the various roles that these accountability measures have played in
struggling democracies.
Argentina was ruled by several military regimes from 1976 to 1982. These
juntas were responsible for serious human rights offenses including assassinations,
illegal detentions, and forced disappearances of more than 10,000 people.
43 In
1983, Raul Alfonsin was elected President after the junta rulers granted themselves
complete amnesty. Alfonsin refused to accept this wholesale amnesty and instead
established the National Commission on Disappeared Persons.
4 In 1984, it
published its report, "Nunca Mas" (Never Again), which specified the methods of
human right abuses and recommended that the justice system be improved, that
reparations be made to the families, and that safeguards be developed to protect
from future abuses. 45 The report resulted in the prosecution of two former
presidents and military leaders, but as the prosecutions started reaching mid-
40. See id. at 7. Some of these Latin American countries include Uruguay, Honduras, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador. Id.
41. See generally Schabacker, supra note 38, at 15-21 (providing a brief synopsis of South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its objectives).
42. See generally William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145 (2004).
43. See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Punishing Human Rights Abuses in Fledging Democracies: The
Case of Argentina, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 161
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
44. See Schabacker, supra note 38, at 8. The Commission had access to government facilities, was
provided funding for its staff, and ordered the military to cooperate with the ongoing investigation.
However, the Commission had no subpoena powers and could not compel testimony. See id.
45. See id.; see Comision Nacional Sobre La Desaparicion De Personas, Nunca Mas: The Report
of the Argentine National Commission of the Disappeared (1 st Am. ed. 1986).
VOL. 34:3
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ranking military officials, the military embarked on a campaign of vocal opposition
that entailed bombings and threats of another coup. 46 The government found itself
unable to confront the military forces and passed a "Due Obedience Law" which
exempted lower officials from liability. 47 President Saul Menem later pardoned
officers not covered by the Due Obedience Law. 8 The Argentine truth
commission, despite being the region's first and best known, represents an
example of coerced pardon which prevented domestic violence, but which also fell
short of accomplishing the goals of international justice.
Chile returned to democracy in 1990 after sixteen years of military
dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet. The newly elected President Patricio
Aylwin created the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, with the mandate to
"contribute to the overall classification of the truth about the worst violations
carried out in recent years. ' ' 49 However, the Commission's mandate precluded anyjudicial function and its report, released in 1991, focused on the victims of abuse
rather than on its perpetrators. 50 A broad amnesty law that had been passed by
Pinochet remained undisputed, and Pinochet himself retained control over the
army until his appointment as Senator for Life in March of 1998.5' The Chilean
government never attempted to instigate criminal proceedings, citing amnesty laws
passed by the Pinochet regime. 52 The commission thus accomplished its truth-
seeking function, but failed to reach justice. The case of Chile illustrates that truth
commissions may fall below the norms of international law unless they are coupled
with other meaningful accountability mechanisms.
The Commission on The Truth for El Salvador was established as a result of a
negotiated settlement between parties to the civil war. It was named by the United
Nations itself in an effort to reach a peace agreement to a violent internal conflict. 53
The Commission focused on two types of cases: those involving serious human
rights violations, and those revealing a pattern that indicated an intent to intimidate
a particular societal group.54 Even though the Commission employed an
international staff of investigators and received testimony from over 2,000 people,
it did not have access to security forces files and had no power to compel
testimony.55 The Commission released a report in March of 1993, detailing the
offenses committed by both sides of the conflict and recommending human rights
protection in El Salvador.5 6 However, the report did not recommend criminal
46. Schabacker, supra note 38, at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Jorge Mera, Chile: Truth and Justice Under the Democratic Government, in IMPUNITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 172 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
50. Schabacker, supra note 38, at 10.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 11. The El Salvador Truth Commission was the first official international
commission that investigated serious abuses since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II.
See id.at n.66.
54. Schabacker, supra note 38, at 12.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 13. The Peace Accords of El Salvador established the U.N. Commission on the Truth for
2006
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prosecutions because the Salvadoran judiciary would be unable or unwilling to
handle prosecutions. 57 Five days after the report was released, the governing
regime issued a sweeping general amnesty, claiming that the real wishes of the
people were to "forgive and forget." 58 The Salvadoran Supreme Court refused to
hear a challenge to the amnesty law, stating that this was a political question
beyond its judicial reviewing powers.
59
On the whole, the Latin American truth commissions served a truth-seeking
function without going further and imposing individual liability for human rights
violations. Because these commissions were stymied by their limited powers and
by the everlasting threat of the return of the military, they tended to equate pardon
with amnesty and truth-seeking with accountability. Thus, the Latin American
paradigm illustrates a situation where non-legal measures for the redress of human
rights abuses fall short of the internationally mandated norms.
6 0
B. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
South Africa was ruled by a policy of racial discrimination, also known as the
apartheid regime, since 1 9 4 8 .6 1 Human rights violations during this era were
persistent and severe. Cases of abuse included murder, torture, suffocation,
beatings, disappearances, and detentions without trial. 62 In 1991, the South African
President, F.W. de Klerk, announced the abandonment of apartheid, and by
November of 1993, talks between the de Klerk government and the opposing
African National Congress ("ANC") had commenced. The ANC rejected a
proposal for a blanket amnesty early on in the talks, and in July of 1995, the South
African Parliament established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission("TRC"). 6
The TRC's articulated objective was to "promote national unity and
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and
divisions of the past."64 It began to accept amnesty applications in December of
1995, and by mid-1998, it had received 7,060 applications. 65 To be eligible for
El Salvador. This resulted in a final agreement between the government of El Salvador and the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front at Chapultepec, Mexico, signed on January 16, 1992. See
From Madness to Hope: The Twelve Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth
for El Salvador, U.N. SCOR, 48th sess., Annex, at 10, 189-92, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993).
57. Schabacker, supra note 38, at 13.
58. Id.
59. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 42 n.8.
60. See Schabacker, supra note 38, at 14-15.
61. See id. at 17.
62. See id. at 16.
63. See id. at 17. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established through the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Bill by the South African Parliament in July of 1995.
See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 para. 2(1) (1995) [hereinafter Unity
and Reconciliation Act], Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act953 4 .htm (last visited December 19, 2005).
64. See Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 63, at para. 3(1).
65. See Schabacker, supra note 38, at 19. Out of all the applications considered, 125 individuals
were granted amnesty, 61 were rejected for substantive reasons, and 4,540 applicants were refused
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amnesty the applicant had to fully disclose all relevant facts and meet the burden
of proving that the acts committed were associated with a political objective.
Individuals who failed to file with the TRC or who refused to disclose their acts in
full remained subject to criminal prosecution, with the caveat that testimony given
before the TRC could not be used against the individual in the criminal trial. 66 The
Commission concluded its work in October of 1998 and presented a report which
documented human rights abuses by all major South African political parties,
including the ANC.6 7 According to the TRC Chairman, Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, "it is only on the basis of truth that true reconciliation can take place."
68
Unlike the Latin American paradigm, the South African truth commission
represents an example of a non-legal accountability method that rises to the
standards of international law and that accomplishes both the mission of truth
finding and the pursuit of justice.69 In addition to its expansive investigatory
powers, the TRC did not preclude further criminal prosecutions and did not in any
way obscure the path toward accounting for human rights violations. The South
African paradigm proves that a TRC can function better in an unstable and
painfully divided country. In such a situation, one wonders whether certain types
of amnesty can be an exception to the international duty to prosecute.
C. Sierra Leonian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991 and lasted over a decade. The
war was brutal: several military factions fought against each other while forcefully
enlisting child soldiers, abducting and sexually abusing young girls, mutilating
civilian populations, and burning entire villages. 70 The atrocities committed were
vast; the number of lives taken or ruined immense. After two peace agreements
collapsed, a third one was negotiated in 1999 in Lome, the capital of the
neighboring country of Togo. 71 The Lome Peace Agreement, signed by all warring
administratively, because of, inter alia, denial of guilt, actions for personal gain, actions without a
political objective, actions outside the jurisdiction of the commissions. Id. See also Amnesty Hearings
and Decisions, Truth & Reconciliation Commission: Amnesty Committee,
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/index.htm (last visited October 30, 2005) (providing statistics of
amnesty decisions).
66. See Schabacker, supra note 38, at 19. The Commission had significant investigative powers. It
could subpoena persons and require the production of evidence. Furthermore, individuals who refused
to comply with the TRC subpoenas could be fined or even imprisoned for up to a year. The mandate of
the TRC however did not grant it the power to impose criminal punishment on individuals failing to
meet the amnesty criteria. Id. at 18-19.
67. Id. at 20.
68. Atrocious Things Were Done on All Sides, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1998, at A32.
69. The South African Constitutional Court has upheld the Unity and Reconciliation Act,
suggesting that democracy is the most important value and underlining the nature of the amnesty law in
question--it conditions amnesty on confession to the TRC and on the determination by the TRC officials
about the nature of the crime. See Azanian People's Org. and Others v. President of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) (S. Afr).
70. See Daniel J. Macaluso, Note, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision
in the Lome Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L L. 347, 363-66 (2001).
71. Id. at 348.
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factions and endorsed by the United Nations, 72 contained a broad amnesty clause
granting amnesty to all civil war participants, and in particular, to Foday Sankoh,
the leader of the notorious Revolutionary United Front ("RUF"), which was
responsible for most of the atrocities committed.73 The Lome Peace Agreement
also provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
("TRC"), which was to be established within 90 days and which was to issue a
report within one year of the date that the agreement was signed.74 The TRC's
purpose was very similar to the one that had operated in South Africa: its goal was
to document human rights abuses that had taken place during the civil war in an
effort to bring about national healing, reconciliation, and to solidify the internal
peace process.75 The TRC began work in December of 2002 and issued a report in
2004.76
On its surface, the Sierra Leonian TRC could have been as successful as the
South African model. Unlike the South African TRC, the TRC in Sierra Leone did
not have the power to grant absolute amnesty to anybody who testified before it;
thus, such witnesses could have been later prosecuted in Sierra Leonian national
courts. 77 Furthermore, the political situation in Sierra Leone in 1999, when the
TRC was established, seemed far more unstable than the situation in South Africa
when its TRC began operating in 1995. Thus, a reconciliation mechanism that
would strengthen domestic unity and bring closure to the internal conflict seemed
like a decent idea for a war-tom country like Sierra Leone. Its TRC could have
functioned successfully.
However, in the summer of 2000, Sierra Leonian President, Tejan Kabbah,
wrote to the Security Council requesting that it establish an international criminal
court to prosecute RUF leaders, who, according to the President, had reneged the
Lome Peace Agreement by committing further human rights violations, and who
no longer deserved the protection of the amnesty clause in the Lome Peace
Agreement. 7 8  The Security Council endorsed this proposition and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone was established in 2002 with a three-year mandate to
72. See S.C. Res. 1260, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4035th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1260 (1999).
73. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/lomeratificationact.html (last
visited on Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter "Lomd Peace Agreement"]. In a peculiar twist, the United
Nations representative appended a hand-written reservation, stating that the U.N. could not endorse
amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. No such reservation had been entered by the U.N. at the time of the 1996 Abidjan
Peace Agreement, which had also contained a broad amnesty clause for all combatants, and which the
U.N. had fully endorsed with no reservations. See Schabas, supra note 41, at 154-57.
74. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 67, art. XXVI.
75. "A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the
cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to
tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation."
Id.
76. Schabas, supra note 41, at 152.
77. See id. at 152-53 (noting that perpetrators regularly appeared before the TRC to testify despite
the fact that they had no amnesty to gain in return).
78. See id. at 153-54.
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prosecute those most responsible for human rights violations in Sierra Leone. 79
The Special Court's Statute provided for a wider subject-matter jurisdiction:
defendants could be prosecuted for a variety of crimes, going far beyond the
"standard" crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 80  As
such, the Special Court severely undermined the Lome Peace Agreement's
amnesty clause. 8 1 Even if one were to interpret the Lome Peace Agreement in light
of the evolving international custom that amnesty cannot be granted for genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the Special Court Statute remains
problematic as it also provides for prosecution for other crimes, such as attacks on
U.N. personnel, abducting a girl under 13, and setting fire to dwelling houses or
public buildings.
82
The Special Court began working in 2002, roughly around the same time as
the TRC, and its work has somewhat undermined that of the TRC. For one
example, the Special Court issued an indictment against Sam Hinga Norman,
leader of the Civil Defense Force ("CDF"), one of the warring factions widely seen
as having attempted to combat RUF's heinous atrocities. Sam Hinga Norman most
likely would have been the perfect candidate to testify before the TRC; however,
the Special Court has forbidden him to do so. 8 3 Furthermore, the Special Court
judges ignored the amnesty issue and affirmed the court's legitimacy by
announcing that the court's establishment is in accord with international law and
standards.84 Thus, the court's judges emphasized that the court's existence is fully
valid and necessary under international law, thereby implicitly diminishing the
TRC's role as an accountability mechanism. 85  The Sierra Leone paradigm
exemplifies perfectly the difficulty of the amnesty versus prosecution issue and
begs the question - is there an international duty to prosecute violators of human
rights norms, and if so, what does that duty entail?
79. See id. at 154,157.
80. Macaluso, supra note 69, at 353-54.
81. It should be noted that the Special Court Statute only collides with the Lomd Peace
Agreement's amnesty clause regarding crimes committed between 1996 and 1999, because the Special
Court was granted jurisdiction as of 1996 whereas the Lomd Peace Agreement provided for amnesty
until 1999, the date that the agreement was signed. However, note that according to the lex posterioris
principle, the Special Court Statute would have most likely "trumped" the Lomd Peace Agreement.
Schabas, supra note 41, at 159. Regardless of this conclusion, the fact remains that the two instruments
collide with respect to the accountability mechanisms they provide for the period of 1996-1999.
82. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 4, 5 available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
83. See Peter Penfold, Limits to Transitional Justice, ALL AFRICA GLOBAL MEDIA, Mar. 15, 2005.
84. See Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Joined Cases SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) & SCSL-2004-16-
AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone
(Appeals Chamber), paras. 14, 42, 63 (Mar. 13, 2004) available at http://www.sc-
sl.orglDocuments/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-I.pdf (noting that the Lom& Peace Agreement was not an
international instrument, whereas the Special Court is an autonomous and independent institution;
noting also that the Sierra Leone government had not reneged the Lomd Peace Agreeement because the
Special Court Statute is consistent with the developing norm of international law and with the U.N.
reservation on the execution of the Lom6 Peace Agreement).
85. Id. The Appeals Chamber declared that Sierra Leone could not legally declare an amnesty for
"crimes under international law that are the subject of universal jurisdiction." Id. at para. 71.
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IV. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
While most commentators and scholars agree that some general duty exists to
implement an accountability mechanism for human rights abuses, the content of
that duty remains uncertain under the substantive body of international law.
86
Because the domineering concept of state sovereignty has shaped most
international law discussions, human rights law has traditionally left substantial
discretion to each individual state to address violations committed within its
territory. Once the global awareness about the seriousness of human rights offenses
grew, international law began to place higher duties on states to punish crimes
inflicted inside their jurisdictional reach. Thus, a significant body of treaty law
emerged in the aftermath of World War 1I, evidencing both clear legal obligations
to redress human rights abuses and an absolute customary norm against such
violations. 87 The major sources of the evolving international criminal law
principles involve treaty law, specific human rights conventions, customary law,
and other international documents, as well as United Nations reports and
international compensation commissions.
A. Treaty Law
Several international conventions provide for a clear duty to prosecute human
rights crimes. Under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
"[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
failure to perform a treaty." 88 It follows that where these conventions are
applicable, a state party would breach its treaty obligation by granting amnesty to a
person responsible for human rights abuses. "Thus, an amnesty law or an exercise
of prosecutorial discretion that is valid under domestic law may nonetheless breach
a state's international obligations." 89 Conventions of notable importance in this
regard include the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the Torture
Convention.
The Genocide Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 9, 1948, and it came into force in 1951. 90 It is one of the most widely
86. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2551-52 (1991) (discussing a state's duty to punish
under international law).
87. See e.g., Joyner, supra note 5, at 597 (noting that the body of international law developed
since 1945 imposes a clear duty on states to prosecute violators of humanitarian law and of human
rights crimes); see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way
Forward, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1996) (commenting on recent advancements in the struggle
against human rights violations); Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2554 (noting the recent "trend" in
conventions to require states to punish certain crimes committed within their jurisdiction or under
specific circumstances).
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339,
reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 57 (2003-2004
ed.).
89. Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2553.
90. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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adhered to human rights instruments of the world.9' The Convention recognizes
genocide as an international crime, and further imposes an absolute obligation on
state parties to prosecute persons responsible for genocide.92 As the treaty itself did
not establish a tribunal for such prosecutions, its provisions call for proceedings by
"a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed., 93 It is important to note that under this approach, the responsibility for
prosecuting persons having committed genocide lies exclusively on the state
parties to the Convention. Furthermore, the Convention establishes universal
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and permits no derogation from any of its
substantive provisions.
9 4
The four Geneva Conventions, negotiated in 1949, attempted to codify the
existing rules concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in
occupied territories. 95 Each one of the Conventions enumerates the so-called
"grave breaches," which are international war crimes and include, inter alia,
willful killing, torture, inhuman treatment, and unlawful confinement of civilians.
96
State parties have an absolute obligation to prosecute and punish persons
responsible for the grave breaches of the Conventions, unless they choose to
extradite such persons to another state party. The commentary to the Conventions
confirms that "state parties can under no circumstances grant perpetrators
immunity or amnesty....97
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment (Torture Convention) entered into force in 1987.9 8 It
requires all state parties to establish torture as a crime under their domestic law, to
provide for jurisdiction over such offenses, and to either extradite the alleged
91. See Schabacker, supra note 38, at 25 (noting that currently 122 states are parties to the
Genocide Convention).
92. Contracting states agree that "persons committing genocide ... shall be punished, whether
they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide
Convention, supra note 84, at art. 4.
93. Id. at art. 6.
94. See id. Note however that the Genocide Convention does contain two limitations that render it
inapplicable in some cases: first, it requires the offender to have specific intent to destroy a substantial
portion of the target group; and second, the victims must be representatives of one of the protected
groups in the Convention, which include national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. See Scharf, supra
note 2, at 45. Thus, the Convention does not preclude attacks directed against political groups. See id.
95. Scharf, supra note 2, at 43.
96. Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 6
U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
97. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 44.
98. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force
June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
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offender or instigate proceedings before competent state authorities. 99 The Torture
Convention's aut dedere autjudicare formulation ° ° signals a clear duty to impose
some form of liability on the persons responsible for torture.""1 Furthermore, the
Convention contains no derogation clauses and thus precludes state parties from
enacting amnesty provisions immunizing torturers from prosecution. 102 Finally, a
decision rendered by the Committee Against Torture in 1990, a body established to
examine compliance with the Convention concerning Argentine amnesty laws,
suggests that there exists an international duty to prosecute for crimes of torture.1
0 3
The committee in dictum referred to various international human rights documents,
stating that "there existed a general rule of international law which should oblige
all states to take effective measures to prevent torture and to punish acts of
torture." 1
0 4
B. Human Rights Conventions
Even though general human rights conventions are usually silent about the
duty to punish abuses of these rights, they do obligate state parties to "ensure" such
rights. Furthermore, authoritative interpretations of human rights treaties suggest
that states have a clear obligation to investigate violations such as torture, extra-
judicial killings, and forced disappearances in order to provide for individual
accountability of those responsible. 10 5 This duty stems not only from the states'
pledge to respect the enumerated rights, but also from the requirement that
individuals whose rights were violated have an effective remedy before a
legitimate judicial body. The most important human rights treaties include the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
99. See id. at art. 2, 4, 5, 7. For further information on the Torture Convention, see Joyner, supra
note 5, at 605.
100. This formulation means that a country can either extradite the alleged offender or prosecute
him under its own law. See Torture Convention, supra note 92, at art. 7.
101. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 46-47 (refuting the argument made by some commentators that the
Torture Convention might allow for some amnesty laws); see also Schabacker, supra note 38, at 27
(noting the "explicit duty" for state parties to institute criminal proceedings which prevents the parties
from enacting amnesty laws to exculpate alleged torturers).
102. See Schabacker, supra note 38, at 27. According to the Torture Convention's drafters, "[iun
applying article 4 [requirement to make torture punishable by severe penalties 'which take into account
their grave nature'] it seems reasonable to require, however, that the punishment for torture should be
close to the penalties applied to the most serious offenses under the domestic legal system." J. HERMAN
BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK
ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT 129 (1988).
103. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 47-48; soe also Schabacker, supra note 38, at 28.
104. See Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, Annex
V: Decisions of the Committee Against Torture under article 22 of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment concerning Communications Nos.
1/1988, 2/1988 and 3/1988, at Ill, U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990) available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b4043cl 256a450044f331/dd522d92efDcc9fecl 2570380
0394764/$FILE/N9015475.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2005).
105. See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2568.
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("European Convention"), and the American Convention on Human Rights
("American Convention").
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR illustrates three basic duties for member states: to
"ensure that any persons whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy," to ensure that such remedy shall be
"determined by a competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities," and
to ensure that the mentioned authorities "shall enforce such remedies when
granted."'' 0 6 Even though the scope of these duties is unclear, several arguments
signal that the state obligations under Article 2(3) are not to be construed as
inconsistent with the duty to provide some accountability mechanisms for human
rights offenders.
First, the drafters of the ICCPR sought to implement the broadest range of
remedies for human rights violations. Thus, Article 2(3) was designed to ensure
that states provided at least non-criminal remedies, such as restitution or an order
to cease the wrongful conduct.' 07 Second, the drafters attempted to avoid language
that would suggest the same solution regardless of the seriousness of the state
violation. Third, some commentators have argued that the duty to ensure rights
implies the duty to prosecute because failure to criminalize human rights abuses
creates a culture of impunity. 10 8 Finally, recent reports from the Human Rights
Committee, a body created to monitor compliance with the ICCPR, suggest that a
state's duty to ensure human rights would preclude the granting of amnesties.1°9
The Committee has reiterated important principles regarding the duty to prosecute
in recent communications to three state parties: Zaire,' ° Suriname,"' and
Uruguay. 2 In addition, the Committee issued a general comment in 1992 stating
that amnesties exculpating the acts of torture "are generally incompatible with the
duty of State to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within
their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future."' '3
The European Convention does not provide for an explicit duty to punish
violators of human rights.' 14 However, it is clear that the Convention's guarantee
106. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2(3), 999 U.N.T.S.
171(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
107. See generally Schabacker, supra note 38, at 22-23.
108. See generally Scharf, supra note 2, at 48-50; Schabacker, supra note 38, at 22-23.
109. Schabacker, supra note 38, at 23.
110. The Human Rights Committee stated that Zaire was "under a duty to ... punish those found
guilty of torture and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future." Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex XIII, 13, U.N.
Doc.A/39/40 (1984).
111. The government of Suriname was urged "to bring to justice any persons found to be
responsible." Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex X,
16, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985).
112. "The government of Uruguay should take immediate and effective steps ... to bring to justice
any persons found to be responsible." Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex XXII, 16, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983).
113. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20 (44) (article 7), para. 15, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2 I/Rev. 1/Add.3 (1992).
114. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
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of fundamental rights includes a right to remedy when those rights have been
violated. In X and Y v. Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found
that the Dutch government had violated the right to respect for private life
articulated in Article 8 of the Convention by not recognizing a rape victim's cause
of action against the perpetrator. 115 The Court acknowledged that in this case, only
criminal law could provide the appropriate remedy: "Effective deterrence is
indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law
provisions." 116 The court thus recognized that a right, if it is to have any
substantive value, needs to be assured by a duty to protect that right.
The American Convention, despite its lack of specific mention of a duty to
prosecute human rights violations, has been interpreted to require state parties to
investigate and punish serious abuses of physical integrity. 117 In its first case,
Velasquez-Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights construed
Article 1(1) of the Convention to impose on states "a legal duty to take reasonable
steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to
carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to
identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation."' 18 The Court thus found Honduras responsible for
the unresolved disappearance of Mr. Velasquez, basing its analysis on the above-
mentioned duties stemming from Article 1(1).' 19 In particular, the Court reiterated
that as a consequence of the affirmative obligation to ensure those rights, the state
parties must "organize the governmental apparatus and in general, all the structures
through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights."' 120 The Velasquez-
Rodriguez decision has been cited as evidence of an implied duty to punish present
in human rights instruments, such as the American Convention or the ICCPR. 121
Furthermore, since this judgment, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has interpreted the legality of amnesties in El Salvador, Uruguay, and
Argentina. 122 In all three cases, the Commission has found that the amnesty law
violated the American Convention's right to remedy and to due process. 123 "The
Inter-American Commission approach suggests that even when the duty to punish
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1952); Schabacker, supra note 38, at 34.
115. For a fuller discussion of this case, see Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2580-81; see also
Schabacker, supra note 38, at 34.
116. X and Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 27 (1985).
117. Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2576 & n.165; see American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673.
118. Velisquez-Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 174 (1988) available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf-ing/seriec_04_ing.pdf.
119. See id. at para. 194.
120. Id. at para. 166. The court further stated: "If the State apparatus acts in such a way that the
violation goes unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as
possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights
to the persons within its jurisdiction." Id. at para. 176.
121. See Schabacker, supra note 38, at 31.
122. Id. at 32.
123. Id.
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is not specifically stipulated in an instrument, parties to the Convention are bound




Several scholars have suggested that there is an international custom against
two types of human rights abuses. The first includes violations of physical
integrity, such as torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions, while the
second involves crimes against humanity. 125 Even though the legal status of these
prohibitions may be clear, their precise scope has been widely disputed. Experts
disagree, inter alia, on how many violations trigger international responsibility and
on whether there is a duty to prosecute or merely a prohibition on these types of
conduct. 1
26
The duty to prosecute perpetrators of grave violations of physical integrity is
explicit in several recently drafted documents. These include the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, a Draft Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons From Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, a Draft Inter-American
Convention on the Forced Disappearances of Persons, and Principles on the
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions. 27 These documents, while not conclusive, evidence the emerging
customary norm that states have a duty to punish serious human rights abuses.
Furthermore, a range of U.N. and other organizations' activities regarding
punishment of these abuses indicate the global community's concern about the
states' duty to ensure the respect for life and physical integrity. 128 Finally, the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States presents the
view that "a government may be presumed to have encouraged or condoned these
acts... if such acts, especially by its officials, have been repeated or notorious and
no steps have been taken to prevent them or to punish the perpetrators."' 129 The
above principle reiterates that failure to punish violations of human rights
represents a breach of customary law and renders the government equally
responsible. The view that there is an international custom against violations of
physical integrity mandating prosecution of the implicated perpetrators has
garnered sufficient support in the international community to suggest at the least
the creation of an evolving norm.
124. Id. at 33. For a full discussion on the Inter-American Commission approach, see id.; see also
Scharf, supra note 2, at 51.
125. See e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2582-93; Scharf, supra note 2, at 52-59; Schabacker,
supra note 38, at 36-44.
126. See e.g., Scharf, supra note 2, at 58 (noting the problems relating to the argument that there is
a customary duty to prosecute for crimes against humanity); Schabacker, supra note 38, at 37 (noting
problems of divergent state practice); Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2582 (noting scholarly
disagreement about the range of protected human rights under customary law).
127. Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2584.
128. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 86, at 95-96.
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §702(b) (1987).
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The position that there is a customary duty to prosecute persons responsible
for crimes against humanity is not novel. Several scholars have noted that the
granting of amnesty to those who commit such crimes is a violation of
international law. 130 The term "crimes against humanity" originated in 1915 in the
joint declaration of the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia,
denouncing the massacre of a huge Armenian population in Turkey.131 The Charter
for the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal was the first international document to
codify such crimes.132 Even though the Charter required specific linkage between
the crimes committed and the course of warfare, it is almost certain that the
concept of crimes against humanity now extends to violations committed during
peacetime. 133
Customary international law arises in part from consistent state practice.
34
Because the granting of amnesties to those who commit crimes against humanity
has become somewhat widespread, arguments have been made that state practice
points against the alleged customary norm of imposing a duty to prosecute
perpetrators of these crimes. 135 However, those who support the existence of the
custom imposing an affirmative duty to prosecute maintain that states are generally
aware of this custom and grant amnesty for other reasons. "Even those states which
have adopted amnesty laws and thereby allowed impunity do not deny the
existence, in principle, of an obligation to prosecute, but invoke countervailing
considerations, such as national reconciliation or the instability of the democratic
process."' 13 6 This line of reasoning has also embedded itself in the International
Court of Justice's decision in the Nicaragua Case and in the U.S. Court of Appeals
130. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 52 & n.67.
131. See id. at 52.
132. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
1 (1992); see also Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544,82 U.N.T.S. 279.
133. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 53. For example, the Secretary General's Report on the Statute of
the Yugoslavia Tribunal, prepared by the United Nations Office of Legal Counsel on the basis of rules
considered to be customary international law, stated that crimes against humanity were now prohibited
"regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict." Id.; see Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th sess., at para.
47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S25704.htm (last visited
December 10, 2005). Furthermore, the first decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal
reiterated that the nexus requirement had become obsolete. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-
AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 72 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/5 1002.. Finally, the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda defines crimes against humanity, without requiring a link between the acts
committed and warfare. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 54-55.
134. For a fuller discussion of customary international law, see Schabacker, supra note 38, at 37-
42.
135. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 57.
136. Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5, 21
(1994).
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for the Second Circuit judgment in the Filartiga Case. 137 Thus, there has been
substantial support for the position that under customary law, states have an
affirmative duty to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity. Such
an assertion, if not entirely true, suggests at the least the evolution of yet another
customary norm. "The law proscribing crimes against humanity has commanded a
uniquely powerful commitment by the world community, which has resolved




Outside of the context of treaty and customary law, there are a number of
other documents that point toward an affirmative duty to prosecute human rights
abuses. While not a binding source of international law, these documents signal the
growing awareness about the seriousness of the violations committed and a
genuine global concern about accountability. "These declarations pronounce the
same standards: There must be an investigation; prosecution of those accused of
serious violations of human rights; specific disallowance of blanket amnesties; and
redress and compensation."'
' 39
The first type of international documents reflecting a duty to provide
accountability for human rights violations is a series of compensation
commissions, such as the Gulf War Compensation Commission.140 A large number
of U.N. declarations on forced disappearances and prevention of summary
executions have all confirmed the principle that redress and compensation are
essential in ensuring basic respect for human rights norms.' 4 1 Second, the U.N.
Human Rights Subcommission has published several reports against impunity,
stating that truth, justice, and compensation are necessary requirements in the
plight against non-accountability. In a 1989 report, the Subcommission concluded
that "reparation for certain gross violations of human rights that amount to crimes
under international law includes a duty to prosecute and punish perpetrators.' 42
Third, other non-binding U.N. documents recognize a duty to punish grave abuses
of human rights. These include the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
From Enforced Disappearances and the Principles on the Effective Prevention and
137. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 59 for a full discussion of the arguments that there is a duty to
prosecute based on international custom as evidenced in the Nicaragua and in the Filartiga cases (noting
however that this argument is factually and analytically incorrect).
138. Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2595.
139. Peter A. Schey et al., Addressing Human Rights Abuses: Truth Commissions and the Value of
Amnesty, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 325, 340 (1997). Note also that one of the most important non-binding
documents of this sort is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "[e]veryone has
the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at Art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
140. See Schey, supra note 138, at 340.
141. See id.
142. Study Concerning The Right to Restitution, Compensation And Rehabilitation For Victims Of
Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. ESCOR, 45th sess., Agenda Item 4, at para.
137(5), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8.
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Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Executions. 143 Finally,
several Security Council resolutions have called for states to bring individuals
responsible for serious international crimes to justice. 144 The above documents
establish a general tendency of international law to require prosecutions.
"International law requiring punishment of atrocious crimes-and, more to the
point, international pressure for compliance-can provide a counterweight to
pressure from groups seeking impunity."'145 Thus, even though some of the
international declarations and reports may not be binding in the legal sense, they
nonetheless serve to induce compliance with the international standards and to
strengthen those standards by pushing them toward the sphere of erga omnes
norms and jus cogens rules. 14 6 Finally, the substantive body of documents
reflecting the duty to prosecute help define its precise contours in an effort to
answer a challenging question: when does international law require a state to
provide for individual accountability regarding persons who have committed
human rights abuses?
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IMPUNITY
"To shew mankind, that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment
is not the necessary consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of
impunity...." 147 Most commentators would agree that impunity, particularly in
cases of grave human rights abuses, is unwarranted in international law. However,
the intricacies and complexities regarding the interrelations of the global
community fail to provide an easy answer to the prevention of non-accountability.
The difficult inquiry entails in particular the scope of states' duties to implement
individual accountability methods for the punishment of human rights offenders.
When does international law circumvent the principle of state sovereignty to
affirmatively dictate that a state hold a person legally responsible for certain
crimes? Furthermore, when and under what circumstances is the lack of criminal
accountability justified? The following sections address the above questions in an
attempt to clarify how international law could best achieve its ultimate mandate:
the pursuit of justice.
143. See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2584.
144. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 59. For example, Resolution 748 required Libya to surrender two
Libyan nationals charged with bombing Pan Am Flight 103 for prosecution in the United States or in
the United Kingdom and Resolution 837 called for the arrest of a Somali national, Mohamed Farrah
Aidid, charged with the murder of 24 U.N. peacekeepers. Id. Security Council resolutions establishing
the criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda not only provided specific fora for the
prosecution of human right offenders, but also further required all the U.N. member states to cooperate
fully with the tribunals. Id.
145. Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2549.
146. See id. at 2594 ("In the absence of effective enforcement machinery, international law's power
to induce compliance with its prescriptions turns on the strength of the norms themselves.").
147. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 158 (William Young 1793)
(1793), quoted in Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2606.
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A. Liability and Accountability Norms
The law governing egregious violations of basic human rights has
traditionally been left to domestic regulation. Furthermore, government officials
carrying out official acts have traditionally enjoyed effective immunity from
prosecution. 148 This inertia by international law to deal with government-sponsored
human rights abuses began to change in the twentieth century. Two norms
emerged as a result of the increasing global concern about human dignity and
individual rights. First, liability rules were shaped creating state responsibility in
cases where a state fails to abide by treaties and customary law, which require it to
respect certain norms. Second, accountability rules appeared that applied directly
to persons and prescribed individual criminal responsibility for certain heinous
crimes against basic human rights.' 49 However, not all liability rules correspond
directly to accountability rules. For example, some violations of human rights
trigger state, but not individual accountability whereas some breaches of those
rights call for individual, but not state responsibility. 150 The difficult question is to
determine when these two norms intersect - when does international law impose a
liability on states to provide for individual accountability?
In answering the above question, it is important to keep in mind two basic
principles of international law. First, a change in government does not relieve a
state of its international obligations. Thus, the fact that a democratic regime
succeeds a repressive dictatorship is irrelevant.'15 Second, the argument that
prosecutions may be inefficient or difficult to implement is not an excuse for a
government's international obligations. An amnesty law ratified through a
democratic procedure could be valid domestically, and yet still result in the state's
breach of international law. 1
52
Despite the confusion in the current body of international criminal law
regarding state duties to prosecute human rights offender, several conclusions can
be drawn based on the developments in the aftermath of World War 1I. First, the
world community has been united in affirming the law of crimes against humanity
originally applied at Nuremberg.' 53 Examples of this include the adoption of the
Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and
j54Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, I as
well as the adoption of two other Conventions providing that crimes against
148. See Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87
GEO. L.J. 707, 710-11 (1999). The only areas of international law that addressed governmental
violations of individual rights involved actions by governments against citizens of other states, as
covered by the law of state responsibility, and the laws and customs of war. Id. at 711 ..
149. For a fuller discussion of liability and accountability norms, see id. at 714-48.
150. See id. at 715.
151. See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2595.
152. See id. at 2595-96.
153. See id. at 2592; see also supra Part III.C.
154. G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
(These principles provide that "[cirimes against humanity, wherever they are committed, shall be
subject to investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have committed such
crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment.").
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humanity shall not be subject to any statute of limitations. 155 "While some aspects
of the law relating to crimes against humanity remain ambiguous, the law's core
principle is both clear and widely accepted: atrocious acts committed on a mass
scale against racial, religious, or political groups must be punished."'
56 Thus, it
follows that international law imposes a general duty upon states to provide for
individual accountability of perpetrators of crimes against humanity.1
57
Second, customary law would be violated by wholesale impunity for
persistent and notorious instances of torture, extra-legal executions, and
disappearances. 158 However, prosecution of every single individual committing
such offenses would not be warranted; accountability imposed upon those most
responsible for the design and effectuation of the system of atrocities would fulfill
the state's international law obligations to prosecute. 159
Third, states that are parties to specific treaties, in particular the Genocide
Convention, The Geneva Conventions, and The Torture Convention have an
international duty to abide by their treaty obligation which entails the prosecution
of human rights offenders. 160 Similarly, arguments have been made that state
parties to the ICCPR, the European Convention, and the American Convention are
generally under a duty to investigate each violation involving the right to physical
integrity. This follows from broad deterrence principles and from authoritative
interpretations of these Conventions by the Human Rights Committee and the
Inter-American Commission. 161
Fourth, selective prosecution may be warranted in some circumstances. Full
enforcement of the above treaty obligations - namely, the duty to prosecute each
violation - would neither prevent past crimes nor deter the possibility of future
abuses. Furthermore, treaties should be interpreted in a manner that avoids
imposing harmful or impossible duties upon states. Thus, a program of "exemplary
punishment" entailing limited prosecutions should be instituted.,
62 Any risk of
arbitrariness posed by selective prosecution could further be minimized through
the establishment of appropriate selection criteria. These standards could embrace
certain domestic law gradations, such as degrees of culpability, mitigation of
155. For a fuller discussion of these conventions, see Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2593-94 &
n.252.
156. Id. at 2594.
157. This duty would also apply to genocide, as evidenced through the Genocide Convention and
through customary law. See discussion infra Parts I1l.A and 111.13.
158. See e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2582 & n. 195.
159. See id. at 2601.
160. See supra note 86 and the accompanying text.
161. See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2599-260 1; see also Scharf, supra note 2, at 50; see supra
Part III.B.
162. See Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2601. "While limitations on prosecutions may be compatible
with states' international obligations, a policy that exonerates large numbers of persons who committed
atrocious crimes offends common standards of justice and diminishes respect for the law. The best
means of accommodating competing values might be to combine a finite program of prosecutions with
legislation establishing a statute of limitations governing further prosecutions." Id.
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punishment, and priority to prosecute leaders. "Such legislation would minimize
the destabilizing effects of trials while affirming the rule of law."' 163
The above principles reflect basic theoretical concepts that have emerged
throughout this century regarding the duty to prosecute. However, state practice
points toward amnesties and truth commissions as alternate methods for
accountability. The relevant issue therefore becomes the need to define the
circumstances under which an amnesty law remains compatible with international
law norms of both state responsibility and individual accountability.
B. Amnesties and Truth Commissions: When Are They Justified?
As discussed above, international law imposes a general duty on states to
provide for some kind of individual accountability for violators of human rights
norms. Theoretically, amnesties and truth commissions could serve as such
responsibility mechanisms. Yet, they should not become ways of procuring de
facto impunity for the alleged offenders or facets of permitting states to evade their
international obligations. It follows that amnesties and truth commissions can be
legal under limited and carefully defined circumstances, which can account for
both the particular country's political and social conditions, as well as for the need
to redress the human rights violations. 1
64
Impunity has been defined as "the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of
bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to account - whether in
criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not
subject to any inquiry that might lead to them being accused, arrested, tried and if
found guilty, convicted."' 165  In the context of human rights norms, impunity
signifies the failure to provide remedies for victims of abuses, or a complete
pardon that spares the offender from serving his sentence. Amnesties, similarly,
lead to the extinction of criminal prosecution and can represent direct forms of
impunity. 16 6 Thus, it follows that amnesties should be prohibited in certain
circumstances: if they are self-granted; if they are procured through coercion - for
example, if a state of emergency is declared; or if the violation involves a non-
derogable human rights norm, such as a crime against humanity or genocide. 167
Furthermore, blanket amnesties have been generally held illegal under
international law. 168 Truth commissions, similarly, while successful in fostering
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 5, at 141-44 (discussing the use of truth commissions in the recent
years and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses).
165. Joyner, supra note 5, at 595.
166. Id. at 612.
167. See generally Joyner, supra note 5, at 612-13; Kritz, supra note 5, at 134, Scharf, supra note
2, at 61 (noting that amnesties may be permissible under some circumstances).
168. See Joyner, supra note 5, at 613-14 (noting that certain crimes cannot be amnestied and that
pardon is permissible only if it takes place after a substantial part of the sentence has been served); see
also Schabacker, supra note 38, at 53 (noting illegitimacy of blanket amnesties unaccompanied by
investigation). These assertions would suggest that amnesties granted within the Latin American
paradigm were generally impermissible under international law, but that the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission might be compatible with the international law duty to prosecute for human
rights abuses.
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peace and national conciliation, can be illegal if they do not produce full justice.
That is, if their only goal is reconciliation, these commissions tend to become
mechanisms of de facto impunity that exculpate serious offenders any time they
come forward with the full truth about the abuse. 169 The mission of justice cannot
be fulfilled by the sole pursuit of truth. Consequently, commissions that preclude
any criminal prosecution fall short of satisfying the reach of international justice
and accountability.
It is clear that amnesties and truth commissions under some circumstances
represent states' violations of their international duties. The more difficult question
however entails defiming when - despite a country's treaty and customary
obligations - amnesties and truth commissions are legal. For example, if instituting
criminal prosecutions would cause a serious threat to a country's political and
social stability, can a government then substitute its duty to punish human rights
abuses by implementing amnesty laws and establishing truth commissions?
Arguments have been made that the duty to prosecute is non-derogable because the
substantive violations for which prosecution is demanded - as torture or crimes
against humanity - are themselves erga omnes norms.
170 However, this argument
fails to consider the two existing exceptions to states' international obligations, as
well as the assertion that specific country situations might dictate an alternative
approach to the duty to prosecute.
First, the customary doctrine of necessity allows a state to derogate from its
international obligation if "the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential
interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril."'' It follows from the
above principle that under limited circumstances, states can justify suspension of
prosecution and institute amnesty laws or truth commissions to address human
rights abuses. Furthermore, the doctrine of force majeure provides for an
additional exception to the duty to prosecute. A state can act inconsistently with
international law if "the act was due to an irresistible force.. .which made it
materially impossible for the State to act in conformity with that 
obligation."' 7 2
The two above excuses suggest not just that the duty to prosecute is after all a
derogable norm, but also that the derogation should only be permitted in
extenuating and exceptional circumstances.
Second, in some countries, military conduct might imperil an essential state
interest and threaten national security. When states emerge from periods of
military dictatorship, and when armed forces continue to control the civilian
government, "a rule requiring civilian authorities to prosecute armed forces may
169. See Joyner, supra note 5, at 610 ("Truth commissions do not produce full justice.").
170. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 85, at 2608.
171. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 32 U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 33, Art. 33(1)(a), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1980/Add. I.
172. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 32 U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 33, Art. 31(I), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1.
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seem inappropriate, and even nonsensical - if not downright dangerous."173
Because excusing such a state completely from its human rights obligations poses
itself highly troubling prospects, an alternate mechanism of individual
accountability, such as a carefully drafted amnesty law or an effective truth
commission, might provide the best solution. 1
74
Certain conclusions about the contours of the duty to prosecute evolve from
the above discussion. In order to redress human rights violations, amnesty laws and
truth commissions must provide for an effective accountability mechanism.1
75
However, because no single formula of accountability can apply to all types of
conflicts, the most sensitive conclusion seems to suggest that the international duty
to prosecute can never be precisely defined. 176 Criminal prosecutions, amnesty
laws and truth commissions represent different methods of achieving the desired
accountability. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but rather,
complimentary, and which combination will be chosen should depend on the
particular conflict and the specific situation. "[W]hichever mechanism or
combination of mechanisms is chosen, it is chosen to achieve a particular outcome




A Talmudic commentary states that if justice is realized, truth is vindicated
and peace results.'7 8 One of the major aims of international justice is to prevent
human rights abuses and to ensure that those rights are respected. From the
viewpoints of both deterrence and retribution, it becomes imperative that
perpetrators of such heinous international crimes be held accountable. Mechanisms
utilized toward the accomplishment of individual responsibility may differ
depending on the circumstances of each case. Thus, carefully tailored amnesty
laws or effective truth commissions can help bring about the desired
accountability. Blanket pardons and powerless investigative bodies can, contrarily,
provide for defacto impunity and obscure the path to justice.
It is essential for states to recognize that there is an international duty to
prosecute persons responsible for grave human rights abuses. However, it is
equally important to realize that there is no single model of accountability that can
173. Orentlicher, supra note 80, at 2611.
174. An example of this kind of non-legal mechanism might be South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. See, e.g. Schabacker, supra note 38, at 53 (noting that the TRC could
provide "an excellent model for future governments making the transition to democracy").
175. See, e.g. Robert 0. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of
Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 857, 870 (1995) (suggesting three minimum
requirements under which amnesties and truth commissions could satisfy the international law duty to
prosecute: "[F]irst, an affirmative inquiry into the facts by the relevant authorities; second, an
opportunity for victims to come forth and tell their stories; and third, an adjudication of sorts--a formal
finding of the facts and conclusions of relevant law.").
176. See, e.g. Schabacker, supra note 38, at 53 (noting that the duty to prosecute human rights
abuses does not bind all states equally).
177. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 23.
178. Id. at 9.
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be applied in each situation. Rather, states should seek to fulfill their international
law obligations by respecting human rights norms and by implementing the best
possible accountability mechanisms to address breaches of those norms. If there is
peace, and if truth is affirmatively sought, justice will hopefully result.
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